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Article 3

THE CONSTITUTION OF NECESSITY
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that
whenever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever
a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.
The Federalist No. 441
Before he enter on the execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:-"I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
U.S. Constitution, Article 112
INTRODUCTION

My proposition is a simple but dramatic one: The Constitution
itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional and national
self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction for the
document's specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements.
The Constitution is not a suicide pact; and, consequently, its provisions should not be construed to make it one, where an alternative
construction is fairly possible. The Constitution should be construed
to avoid constitutional implosion; it should not lightly be given a disabling, self-destructive interpretation. And where such an alternative
saving construction is not possible, the necessity of preserving the Con*

Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School;

Visiting Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law. My thanks to the
extraordinary faculty of the University of St. Thomas School of Law for their
invaluable comments (and criticisms) at a faculty workshop, to the participants at the
Notre Dame Law Review symposium of which this Article is a part, and to Robert
Delahunty, John Nagle, and Saikrishna Prakash for their detailed comments (dare I
say attacks?!) on draft manuscripts. None of these persons should be blamed for the
ideas expressed here; Abraham Lincoln should.
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 253 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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stitution and the constitutional order as a whole requires that priority
be given to the preservation of the nation whose Constitution it is, for
the sake of preserving constitutional government over the long haul,
even at the expense of specific constitutional provisions.
Moreover, the Constitution appears to vest the primary (but
nonexclusive) duty for making these sorts of constitutional judgments-judgments about constitutional interpretation, constitutional
priority, and constitutional necessity-in the President of the United
States, whose special sworn duty the Constitution makes it to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." 3 In
short, the Constitution either creates or recognizes a constitutionallaw
of necessity, and appears to charge the Presidentwith the primary duty of
applying it and judging the degree of necessity in the press of
circumstances.
This is a valuable and a dangerous arrangement. It is valuable in
the sense that it is almost inconceivable for matters to be any other
way. There simply must be power in the national government to preserve the constitutional order; it is inconceivable that the Framers
would have neglected such considerations. And they did not. First,
Congress possesses legislative power to pass laws "necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution ...

all other Powers vested by this

Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."' 4 If national preservation is necessary to
the carrying into execution of other powers vested by the Constitution, Congress has power to legislate measures plainly adapted to national preservation.

5

Second, and even more strikingly, the Presidential Oath Clause
creates a presidential duty to preserve the constitutional order of the
United States. That duty serves as a gloss on the meaning of the "executive power" vested in the President, an allusion to the exercise of a
power assumed to exist. It is, I submit, almost inconceivable that the
President's overarching duty to "preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States" not have priority over, or serve as a
template for understanding, specific provisions of the constitutional
document. The alternative is near-absurdity: that the parts should be
construed, and given effect, even at the expense of preservation of the
3 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
4 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
5 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
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Constitution as a whole, with the logical consequence that adherence
to the Constitution might require destruction of the Constitution.
I have said that this is a valuable and a dangerous arrangement.
The danger is obvious. It is a dangerous arrangement in the sense that
it is capable of being misused and has been misused at various times
in our nation's history. It probably will be misused again. (Some argue that it is being misused today.) But the capacity of a constitutional power to be abused does not disprove the existence of such a
power. It proves only what has just been said-that such a power is
capable of misuse. This is not terribly shocking. All constitutional
power is capable of being abused or misused. My thesis posits a sharp
choice. Either a constitutional law of necessity exists or it does not. If
it exists, it is inherently susceptible of misuse and abuse; if it does not,
the Constitution is a suicide pact. Either horn of the dilemma is bad.
But it is the latter proposition that should be regarded as truly
shocking.
The existence of a constitutional power of necessity, flowing from
the Presidential Oath Clause (and supported by Congress's legislative
powers), does not mean that the President's power is plenary nor that
it should not go unchecked. Both the judiciary, through the power of
constitutional interpretation it possesses in deciding cases arising
under the Constitution, and the Congress, through the power of constitutional interpretation it possesses in exercising its legislative powers and the check of impeachment, have a duty of independent
constitutional review over the judgment of necessity. Abdication of
such a duty, whether by refusal to act or by excessive deference to
executive judgments, renders less valuable and more dangerous the
President's power to act to preserve, protect, and defend the constitutional order in the name of necessity. While the courts, and Congress,
should recognize the correctness of a doctrine of constitutional necessity, and while they should recognize the fact that the Constitution
vests the primary power and duty with regard to such issues in the
President, that does not mean they should go along with whatever the
President says. A constitutional power of necessity necessitates checks
on its exercise. Complete congressional and judicial acquiescence or
abdication has a name. That name is Korematsu.6
Despite the obvious dangers of embracing a doctrine of constitutional necessity, I maintain that such a doctrine is rightin principle. It
is supported by the text of the Constitution, by the structure and deep
6 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (enforcing a U.S.
military order confining American citizens of Japanese descent to concentration
camps).
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logic of permanent constitutional government, and by background
general legal principles of necessity against which the Constitution
was drafted and of which specific passages of the Constitution reflect
acceptance, and understanding. It is also, somewhat ironically, consistent with myriad judicially developed doctrines permitting departure
from what otherwise would be the baseline constitutional rule, in
cases of a "paramount" or "overriding" or "subordinating" or "compelling" state interest. National survival, the protection of innocent life,
and the long-run preservation of constitutional government in its essentials, constitute, I submit, the quintessential case of such compelling interests.
In developing this thesis, I will take as my point of departure the
constitutional theory and practice of President Abraham Lincoln, the
leading constitutional theorist and practitioner of presidential power
to preserve, protect and defend the constitutional order by applying
principles of constitutional necessity in times of crisis. My thesis is not
original-it was Lincoln's. In Part I, I set forth and defend Lincoln's
theory of constitutional necessity, which takes as its cornerstone the
Presidential Oath Clause of Article II.
In Part II, I set forth and defend, at least as a theoretical matter,
three interpretive propositions that flow from a Lincolnesque doctrine of constitutional necessity: first, that the Constitution should be
construed to avoid self-destruction; second, that the Constitution's
provisions, or at least some of them, do not all apply in exactly the
same way in time of war as they do in time of peace; and third, that,
when push comes to shove, specific provisions of the document sometimes may need to yield to preservation and defense of the Constitution as a whole-the "Constitution" in the sense of the constitutional
regime, more broadly conceived.
Finally, in Part III, I conclude by posing the questions of standards, decisionmakers, and dangers: What standard should one apply to

determine the existence of a constitutional necessity? Who is to decide, in the first instance-and who in the last-whether that standard
has been satisfied? And do the answers to these questions provide a
satisfactory, or at least partial, answer to the obvious objection to the
dangers posed by recognition of a constitutional law of necessity?
I.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OATH CLAUSE

The Presidential Oath Clause, located at the end of the first Sec-

tion of Article II, provides as follows:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:-"I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
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that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
protect and deStates, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
7
fend the Constitution of the United States."
Lawyers and legal academics are inclined, by training and practice, to look at questions of constitutional interpretation from the perspective of a judge or justice deciding a case. This is in many ways a
narrow perspective. Consider for a moment the standpoint of a President swearing Article II's oath-that is, the perspective of the person
(and responsible office-holder) actually called upon to take the oath.
What is, so to speak, the "interpretive stance" of someone swearing the
oath of office as President of the United States? Read it again, and
imagine yourself President (and uncorrupted by a law school education). What is the President's duty with respect to the Constitution?
I submit that two propositions flow from the Presidential Oath
Clause, one "procedural" and one more "substantive." First, the procedural point: the President has an independent, personal, and nonabdicable constitutional responsibility of faithful constitutional
interpretation and execution. The President swears that he (or she)
will "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution. The duty is awesome and personal. On its face, the clause appears to assign to the
President a special, unique responsibility to the Constitution, certainly
not one that is subordinate to the judgment of other actors in the
constitutional system. The Presidential Oath Clause seems to suggest
that the President (not the courts) is a kind of special guardian-almost a "Lord Protector"-of the Constitution. Put less grandly, the
President is charged with a personal duty of constitutional
stewardship.
That stewardship necessarily involves the authority and responsibility to interpret the Constitution. How else does one know what it is
one is preserving, protecting, and defending? Even more clearly so
than with the universal oath requirement Article VI of the Constitution commands for all federal and state officers-an oath "to support
this Constitution" 8-the Presidential Oath Clause cannot be reduced
to a general political loyalty requirement. 9 The President swears he
will faithfully execute the office and preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution. That suggests, necessarily, interpretive responsibilities,
even if it might entail broader responsibilities (as I argue presently).
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
8 Id. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
9 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 257-62 (1994) (arguing that the Article VI oath
requirement entails an obligation of faithful interpretation of the Constitution).
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Might not the Presidential Oath Clause even make the President
the "supreme" interpreter of the Constitution-a role, of course, that
the Supreme Court presumptuously has claimed for itself?10 One
must concede that if any clause of the Constitution fairly could be
construed as vesting a power of constitutional interpretive
supremacy-an exclusive or superior right of constitutional interpretation-in any one branch, the Presidential Oath Clause has the best
claim to having made such an assignment; and that assignment appears to be to the President, not the judiciary. 1 But one need not
(and should not 2) go so far in order to recognize that the President is
10 I have argued elsewhere that this self-serving assertion by the judiciary is not
defensible as a matter of interpretation of the Constitution's text, structure, and original understanding. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency
After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1351-59 (1999); Paulsen, supra note 9,
at 284-88. It is also inconsistent with the reasoning of Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137 (1803). See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The IrrepressibleMyth ofMarbury, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2709 (2003) ("The logic of Marbury implies not, as it is so widely
assumed today, judicial supremacy, but constitutional supremacy-the supremacy of

the document itself over misapplications of its dictates by any and all subordinate
agencies created by it."); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 287 ("[The] supremacy-ofjudgments hypothesis also contradicts the established theorem of judicial review by maintaining, contrary to the key step in Marbury, that one branch's view may bind another
branch.").
11 Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, in an opinion defending the lawfulness of Lincoln's unilateral suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
believed that the Presidential Oath Clause, being unique to the President, implied
precisely such a unique role as constitutional "guardian":
All the other officers of the Government are required to swear only "to support this Constitution;" while the President must swear to "preserve, protect,
and defend" it, which implies the power to perform what he is required in so
solemn a manner to undertake. And then follows the broad and compendious injunction to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." And this
injunction, embracing as it does all the laws-Constitution, treaties, statutes-is addressed to the President alone, and not to any other department
or officer of the Government. And this constitutes him, in a peculiar manner, and above all other officers, the guardian of the Constitution-its preserver, protector, and defender.

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 82
(1861).
12 The correct view, I believe, is that no branch or actor under the Constitution
rightfully possesses interpretive supremacy over any other branch or actor. Paulsen,
supra note 9, at 228-40. The Presidential Oath Clause does not say that the President's interpretive power is supreme; it merely confers, by necessary implication, interpretive power as an incident of the President's unique duty to "preserve, protect
and defend" the Constitution. In similar fashion, the Constitution confers, by necessary implication, interpretive power on the judiciary as an incident of its duty to de-
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charged with a power and duty of faithful constitutional interpreta13
tion, and that this duty is unique, personal, and solemn.
The second proposition that flows from the Presidential Oath
Clause is not as immediately evident, but it is extremely important and
is the substantive cornerstone of the doctrine of constitutional necessity: the President'sduty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States logically entails a presidential duty to preserve, protect, and defend the nation whose Constitution it is. The first duty of the President of
the United States is to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States by preserving, protecting, and defending the
United States, by every indispensable means within his power. The constitutional law of necessity flows from the duty created by the Presidential Oath Clause. And the existence of such a constitutional duty of
the President very strongly implies the existence of legitimate constitu14
tional power on the part of the President to carry out that duty.
cide cases or controversies arising under the Constitution. But the latter implied
power even less plausibly implies interpretive supremacy than does the former.
13 The Presidential Oath is not merely an empty formality. The founding generation took oaths extremely seriously, as involving notjust human honor and obligation
but as also entailing extra-temporal consequences-like eternal damnation in the
fires of hell-for their intentional violation. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409,

1466-67 (1990) (reviewing exceptions made for those with religious objections to
oath requirements and showing that oaths were the "principle means of ensuring
honest testimony and solemnizing obligations" and were seen as "indispensable to
civil society"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1457, 1486-90 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997)) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination only makes policy sense on the understanding, foreign to moderns,
that being compelled to testify against oneself might induce a guilty, morally weak
person to commit perjury under oath and thereby incur eternal damnation); Paulsen,
supra note 9, at 257 (noting that Marbury's focus on the Oath Clause in support of
judicial review is not surprising given the profound significance oaths had at the time
of the Founding).
14 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the United States has
the fundamental duty, under Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, to "preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Implicit in that
duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.
Id.; see also Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y.
Gen. at 82 (stating that the duty to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution
"implies the power to perform what he is required in so solemn a manner to
undertake").
Is the Presidential Oath Clause itself a grant of power? Not in form. I believe the
better answer is that the oath imposes a duty with respect to the exercise of powers
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President Abraham Lincoln advanced this view several times. As
usual, Lincoln's argument is persuasive. 15 Consider two extended
passages from Lincoln's most important constitutional writings. The
first is from Lincoln's July 4, 1861 Message to Congress not long after
the outbreak of the Civil War, in which Lincoln explains his actions
between the attack on Fort Sumter and the convening of Congress in
special session, including Lincoln's suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus by military order as Commander in Chief. Chief
Justice Roger Taney had issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering production of an individual in military custody, and had declared Lincoln's suspension of the writ unconstitutional, directing Lincoln to
comply with his order. Lincoln had not done so. Lincoln's refusal to
obey compulsory judicial process raises interesting issues in its own
assumed already to be present in the President by virtue of his having been assigned
"[t]he executive Power" of the United States. It would have made little sense for the
Framers to have imposed on the President a constitutional duty that he did not have
the constitutional power to fulfill. The Presidential Oath Clause is properly understood as an allusion or reference to the power to preserve, protect, and defend the
nation and its constitutional order that inheres in the traditional understanding of
the "executive Power" of a nation. The "executive Power" has generally been understood to include, and would have been understood by the founding generation to
include, a power to protect the nation's existence and defend it against attacks. The
precise contours of such a power, however, are unclear and legitimately disputed. For
excellent general discussions, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-38 (1993) (suggesting that the President does have a
limited power to act in an emergency, and that the courts should not interfere unless
there is no actual emergency or Congress has not subsequently ratified the action
after a reasonable amount of time); and Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
President'sPower Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233-36, 285 (2001) (making the
constitutional, textual argument that the President has a residual foreign affairs
power limited by the nature of the executive power and by the textual grants of specific foreign affairs powers to Congress, and that the President retains a power to
repel attacks under his residual foreign affairs powers).
Commenting on the presentation of this paper at the Notre Dame Law Review symposium, Professor Prakash correctly observed that, in terms of constitutional power to
carry out a constitutional law of necessity, it is "[t] he executive Power" Vesting Clause
of Article II, Section 1 that does the real work. I do not disagree. My proposition
here is that the Presidential Oath Clause supplies the duty and is the source of the set
of principles for a constitutional doctrine of necessity that governs how and when
"[t] he executive Power" may be applied, legitimately, in extraordinary situations.
15 In other writing, I have taken the position that Abraham Lincoln is the single
most important interpreter of the Constitution in our nation's history. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as ConstitutionalInterpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 700-04, 702 n.24) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review) (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION (2003)). Some of the
arguments I make here are also set forth (in less detail) in a part of that Review.
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right-issues I have addressed at length elsewhere.1 6 What is relevant
here, to the doctrine of constitutional necessity, is Lincoln's defense
of his actions on the merits:
[T]he attention of the country has been called to the proposition
that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power, and propriety, before this
matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required
to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the
use of the means necessary to their execution, some single law,
made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to
very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a
case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government
should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the
17
single law, would tend to preserve it?
Lincoln believed that his sworn duty (" would not the official oath be
broken . . .?") to execute the laws and preserve the Constitution required him to do what was necessary to prevent the government from
being overthrown, even if it meant "disregarding" a "single law," because the alternative was the failure to execute all the laws, but that
one. I will have more to say about the implications of the July 4
Message below, concerning the interpretive principles that follow
from a constitutional doctrine of necessity. 18 Here, it is sufficient to
16 See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 276-84 (arguing in favor of the executive's power
to refuse to enforce judgments and employing the decision in Exparte Meryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), as a paradigm for evaluating this proposition); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
Executive Interpretation,15 CARnozo L. REv. 81 passim (1993) (using the Meryman case
to frame the dilemma between complete judicial supremacy and complete presidential interpretive autonomy).
17 President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,
1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-65, at 246, 252-53 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter SPEECHES AND WRITINGS].
18 The Message is a strong statement of the principle of priority: that preservation
of the whole sometimes requires sacrifice of a part. But as we shall see, Lincoln goes
on to take a milder stance sufficient to address the particular situation at issue: that
the principle of necessity can operate as a rule of construction-a substantive "push"
in a certain direction-in cases where the text is ambiguous. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32.
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note that, for Lincoln, all of this comes from the presidential
oath.19

Lincoln says much the same thing in a notable letter to Senator
Albert Hodges in 1864, recalling and putting in writing (evidently at
Hodges's request) a White House conversation between the two, with
others present, some short time before. The letter is an explanation
of the broader constitutional rationale for Lincoln's policy on slavery
and emancipation. The explanation, once again, rests on Lincoln's
oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, and in Lincoln's conception of constitutional necessity flowing from that oath.
The passage merits quotation at length:
I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong.
...
And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred
upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment
and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could
not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I
might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the
power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this
oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract
judgment on the moral question of slavery ....
I did understandhowever, that my oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that
government-that nation-ofwhich that constitution was the organic law.
Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution?
By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb
must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to
save a limb. Ifelt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional,might become
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution,
through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this
ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I
had even tried to preserve the constitution, if to slave slavery, or any minor
19 Lincoln also invoked the structure and logic of the Constitution as standing for
a presumption of permanence to the Constitution, stating that "in contemplation of
universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual .... It is
safe to assert that no government proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for its
own termination." President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1861), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 17, at 217. Lincoln went on to argue
that the Constitution required him to protect the Union from destruction: "I shall
take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the
Union be faithfully executed in all the States .... I trust this [will be regarded as] the
declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend, and maintain itself." Id. at 218. Lincoln's logic applies with equal force when the threat to the Constitution is a foreign nation, and not internal rebellion.

20041

THE CONSTITUTION

OF

NECESSITY

1267

matter, I should
permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution
20
all together.
Lincoln's letter to Hodges is an excellent distillation of the theory
of constitutional necessity. Its origin is the Presidential Oath Clause:
"It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." Its content is the
duty to preserve the nation "of which th[ e] constitution was the organic
law." Its somewhat startling but flawlessly logical implication is that
"measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful," by being nec-

essary to preserve the nation, and thus its Constitution. And its application extends to the justification of the use of "every indispensable
means" within the executive power necessary to attain the paramount
constitutional objective.
II.

THREE INTERPRETIVE PROPOSITIONS

I submit that three interpretive propositions about the Constitution follow-properly follow-from the general proposition that the
law of necessity is an operative principle of the Constitution. They
are, in ascending order of difficulty: first, the proposition that the
Constitution should be construed, where possible, to avoid constitutionally self-destructive results (a "construe-to-avoid-constitutional-difficulty" canon of construction); second, the proposition that some of
the Constitution's provisions apply differently in times of war and crisis than they do in ordinary times; and third, the proposition that,
when push comes to shove, specific provisions of the document may
need to yield to the need to preserve the operation of the Constitution as a whole (what I call the "rule of constitutional priority"). I will
21
consider each in turn.
20 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Albert G.
Hodges, U.S. Senator (April 4, 1864), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 17, at 585
(emphasis added).
21 Professor Prakash, commenting on the presentation of this Article at the symposium session, challenges this ordering of the discussion: Why, he asks, should we
even look at the first two propositions, if the third one is correct? Why notjust cut to
the chase, if, in the end, we are going to find that a principle of constitutional necessityjustifies departing from specific constitutional provisions in the event that neither
of the first two propositions justifies the proposed emergency measure?
The question is a valid one, but there are valid answers. First, though I will argue
for the correctness of each of these three propositions, I recognize that some readers
will not be persuaded by the third one-the most dangerous and controversial of the
three propositions. I would like to leave open the possibility that those readers might
still embrace the correctness of the first two propositions, or even just the first one.
People might agree on the validity of a principle, without agreeing with (or being
willing to accept) the validity of all of its implications, especially the most drastic ones.
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Necessity as a Rule of Construction

First and foremost, the "Constitution of Necessity" properly operates as a meta-rule of construction governing how specific provisions of
the document are to be understood and applied. Specifically, the
Constitution should be construed, where possible, to avoid constitutionally suicidal, self-destructive results. Obviously, constitutional suicide is a result to be avoided; interpretations tending toward such an
outcome thus should be regarded as strongly disfavored. The need to
preserve the Constitution-and accordingly, as Lincoln points out,
the need to preserve the nation whose Constitution it is-operates as
a rule of construction for other constitutional principles. It follows
that specific provisions of the Constitution ought not be read in such
a manner as to defeat the fundamental purposes and goals of the Constitution, or risk the destruction of the nation, if any other interpretation is legitimately possible. Constitutional provisions should not be
construed in a needlessly security-destructive or life-threatening way, if
an alternative "saving" construction is fairly possible.
Such a principle should not be thought extraordinarily controversial. It is of a piece with familiar canons of statutory construction
that hold that statutes ought not lightly be construed in such a manner as to conflict with the Constitution, if an alternative construction
is available. 2 2 A somewhat more questionable variation has it that statutes should similarly be construed to avoid constitutional difficulty, or
constitutional doubts, well short of a showing that the avoided construction actually would present a constitutional infirmity.23 The principle I urge here is that constitutional provisions, as well as statutory
ones, should be construed to avoid "constitutional infirmity" or very
For those, I prefer half a loaf to none at all. Second, precisely for these reasons, it is
prudent for interpreters considering these propositions to consider the least controversial ones first, to see if they are sufficient to dispose of the matter. If not, then and
only then is the more difficult question presented. (Lincoln was a classic practitioner
of this approach, well before it became a commonplace of modern judicial practice.
Indeed, as we shall see, while Lincoln would commonly articulate a sweeping theoretical justification of constitutional necessity, he would often apply a narrower, less controversial principle as a sufficient alternative ground.)
22 See William K. Kelley, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions as a Three-Branch Problem,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 833 n.5 (2001) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases in
which the avoidance canon has been invoked or urged to be applied).
23 Id. at 840-42 (outlining the change in the avoidance canon from interpreting
statutes to avoid unconstitutional results to interpreting statutes to avoid addressing
constitutional questions); John Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1495, 1496 (1997) ("The most noticeable difference between the two rules is
that the unconstitutionality canon requires a court to decide the constitutional question while the doubts canon allows a court to avoid any such decision.").
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serious constitutional difficulty as well-where the constitutionally
problematic interpretation to be avoided is one that would strongly
tend to undermine the existence of the nation and thus the operation
of the Constitution in its entirety. The premise is that an interpretation of a provision that led to (in Lincoln's words) "the wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together" 24 would be, in a
sense, a construction tending toward unconstitutionality, and is to be

avoided on such account.
The point is important enough to be worth careful note, at the
risk of repetition. This is not a rule of bending the Constitution to
avoid untoward outcomes. The theory is, like Lincoln's, that permitting
a nation-destroying outcome is permitting a Constitution-destroying
outcome, and that to allow such an outcome would violate the President's sworn duty to preserve the Constitution. So understood, it
seems equally, if not more, compelling than the various construe-toavoid canons in the area of statutory interpretation.
Consider an excellent historical example of application of this
rule-of-construction principle-Lincoln's defense of the propriety of
his suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as against
Chief Justice Taney's order purporting to invalidate it. As noted
above, Lincoln defended his conduct in his July 4, 1861 Message to
Congress. 25 The underlying constitutional question was a separation
of powers issue: whether the Constitution permitted the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ, or whether this was a power committed to the Congress. Both Taney's order, in the case of Ex parte Mer7yman,26 and Lincoln's July 4 Message, address the question on the
merits.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution is the provision
in question. Like many of the Constitution's empowerments and limitations, it is written somewhat awkwardly, in passive voice: "The Privi-

lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."27 The clause does not specify who may exercise the power to suspend. ChiefJustice Taney offered good arguments, perhaps even persuasive ones, for believing the power to be a congressional one, at
least considered as an abstract proposition. First, the clause is located
in Article I, which concerns Congress's powers. Section 9 is a set of
limitations, or prohibitions, on the exercise of those powers. It fol24
25
26
27

Letter from Abraham Lincoln, supra note 20, at 585.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

1270

NOTRE DAME

LAW

[VOL- 79:4

REVIEW

lows, Taney believed, that even though the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a specifically enumerated
power of Article I, Section 8, that the reference in Section 9 to the
conditions under which the writ may be suspended means that the
power of suspending is an implied power of the Congress (perhaps
arising "from the Necessary and Proper Clause) .28 Second, Taney
highlights the history of the Great Writ of habeas corpus as a limitation on the prerogatives and power of the King-a check on the executive power-and the implausibility, therefore, of vesting a power to
29
suspend such limitation in the executive.
These are good arguments. Under usual circumstances, Taney's
position might even be thought to be convincing. But Lincoln had
some convincing counterarguments, which he advanced in the July 4,
1861 Message. He began with the more memorable line about the
imperative of national survival, his oath, and necessity, set forth at
great length above: "[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and
the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? . . .
[W] ould not the official oath be broken, if the government should be
overthrovn, when it was believed that disregarding the single law,
would tend to preserve it?"30
That was the more sweeping argument: necessity establishes a priority for preserving the whole, even at the expense of a part (the third
interpretive principle, which I discuss presently). But in the very next
breath-the next sentence-Lincoln backs off to a construe-to-avoid
argument:
But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not be
suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
28

See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148:
The power of legislation granted by this latter clause [i.e., the Necessary and
Proper Clause] is, by its words, carefully confined to the specific objects
before enumerated. But as this limitation was unavoidably somewhat indefinite, it was deemed necessary to guard more effectually certain great cardinal principles, essential to the liberty of the citizen .

.

. by denying to

congress, in express terms, any power of legislation over them.
29

See id. at 151:

If the president of the United States may suspend the writ, then the constitution of the United States has conferred upon him more regal and absolute
power over the liberty of the citizen, than the people of England have
thought it safe to entrust to the crown; a power which the queen of England
cannot exercise at this day, and which could not have been lawfully exercised by the sovereign even in the reign of Charles the First.
30 President Abraham Lincoln, supra note 17, at 253.

2004]

THE CONSTITUTION

OF NECESSITY

1271

safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision-is a provisionthat such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion, or
invasion, the public safety does require it.... Now it is insisted that
Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the
Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the
power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until
Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which
31
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.
This is a necessity-as-canon-of-constitutional-construction argument-a "construe-to-avoid" argument. Sure, Taney's position makes
a good deal of sense as a matter of constitutional structure, logic, and
history. As an abstract interpretive position, it might even have a
claim to be the "better" answer. But the words do not quite say that
Congress, and not the President, has the writ-suspension power. As
Lincoln points out, the provision is not written that way; its purpose
was obviously to address emergency and danger, and the logic of Taney's position, followed to its logical conclusion, would be that the
President would have no power to suspend the writ even if Congress
could not meet to address the situation, with the consequence that the
government would fall and with it the rest of the Constitution. This
cannot be right, Lincoln said.
Perhaps without such a "push" from the principle of necessity,
the interpretive question of whether the President may exercise the
writ-suspension power might come out the other way. 32 But under the

actual circumstances of the case, Lincoln's position is compelling and
sensible, and ends up having more persuasive force than Taney's otherwise persuasive arguments from context, structure, history, and precedent. The need to preserve the nation operates as a meta-rule of
constitutional construction that legitimately can lead to a different interpretive outcome than one otherwise would reach.
Might such a rule of construction be relevant to some of today's
issues? Without pretending to offer a comprehensive discussion, I
hazard some tentative observations, with respect to a few important
issues.
31 Id.
32 The issue is a classic separation of powers question, where the distribution of
power between the legislative and executive branch is unclear or its application is
uncertain-a Youngstown "Category II" situation. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (2002) (discussing Youngstown's
paradigms and applying them to the post-9/11 war on terrorism).
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First, consider the perennial issue of the Constitution's division of
war powers. Congress possesses the power "to declare War," raise and
support armies, regulate the military, and make laws "necessary and
proper" for carrying into execution those powers and the President's. 33 The President is "Commander in Chief"'3 4 of the military
and, further, possesses whatever remains of the traditional "executive
Power '3 5 after the Declare War Clause and other exceptions that Article I makes in favor of Congress. This residual executive power includes a vague power to "repel sudden attacks."3 6 Consider, then,
contemplated military force in situations of debatable emergency: Imagine a nation, believed to be armed with nuclear weapons or rapidly
acquiring such capability, and also believed willing to use such weapons against the United States. Imagine that such a nation is either
developing or in the process of developing the capability of delivering
such weapons, or that it may well be inclined to convey such weapons
to persons possessing such capability. Suppose that the President believes a preemptive attack by U.S. armed forces would be able to dismantle the potentially grave threat to the United States. Suppose the
President believes the dangers of inaction are potentially catastrophic
to the survival of the nation or millions of its people. Suppose also
(what I believe to be true) that the better understanding of the Constitution's allocation of war powers is that Congress, not the President,
has the power to decide to take the nation to war by initiating offensive military hostilities against a foreign sovereign power. Suppose
that requesting congressional authorization would vitiate the opportunity to take the military preemptive action in question. Finally, suppose also that the scope of the assumed power of the President to
"repel sudden attacks" (as a residual war power inherent in the vesting
in the President of the "executive Power") does not obviously extend
to the case of possible but not imminent attacks, and that the power
unclearly, if at all, authorizes a doctrine of unilateral presidential
power to employ military force in a preemptive fashion.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
35 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
36 This is a drastically compressed discussion. For more detail, see Paulsen, supra
note 32, at 239 (arguing that the executive has constitutional power to repel sudden
attacks and imminent threats even in a Youngstown "Category III" situation, where
such action conflicts with congressional commands); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
14, at 285 (reviewing the debate at the Convention over the war power, which resulted
in the congressional power to "declare" war rather than "make" war, and concluding
that the Framers desired to preserve the power of the President to repel attacks, as an
aspect of the residual executive power).
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May the President constitutionally take preemptive military action against the potential foreign aggressor? By hypothesis, the better
answer, considered apart from the constitutional law of necessity
(brought into play by the President's duty to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution by protecting and defending the nation) is
no. As an abstract proposition of constitutional interpretation, the
better legal answer may be that Congress must authorize the use of
offensive military force against an enemy power that commences hostilities of a type fairly characterized as "war," and that this (probably)
does not fall within the scope of the President's executive power to
repel attacks on the nation without awaiting congressional
authorization.
But can this really be right? Under the assumed hypothetical scenario, the President constitutionally must refrain from action he
deems essential to prevent a grave danger to the lives of millions of
Americans. In real world situations like this, of various kinds, the executive branch's legal position, typically, is simply to assert a more expansive view of the scope of the President's inherent military authority
as Commander in Chief than I have posited in the hypothetical. That
is, the executive branch tends to push the envelope of inherent executive military power, claiming that it legitimately falls within the scope
of the President's war powers. Academic theorists, confronted with
such situations (both as a matter of theory or as a matter of historical
practice), but unable to square such executive branch assertions with
Congress's power under the Declare War Clause, will sometimes repair to nontextual doctrines of "inherent" or "emergency" power, to
describe (and, perhaps, defend) such actions (again, either in theory
37
or in practice).
My position is that, assuming legitimate interpretive ambiguity
about the scope of presidential versus congressional constitutional war
powers as applied to the circumstances of the hypothetical situation
described above (or other analogous situations), the President's duty
37 In future work, I hope to take a more comprehensive look at the way the executive branch has defended various assertions of unilateral military power, and the
various ways that scholars have sought to rationalize such assertions of power (in
whole or in part) on alternative grounds. For an excellent general survey of war powers claims by the President throughout history, see Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWER (1995) (surveying presidential use of war powers from 1789 until President
Clinton's military interventions in Haiti and Bosnia). For an excellent general survey

of academic theories of "inherent" or "emergency" presidential powers (and the introduction of a new one of his own- unconstitutionalbut permissible exercises of emergency power), see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
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to "preserve, protect and defend" and his evaluation of the necessity
of unilateral action, properly supplies a constitutionalrule permitting
the President to lawfully resolve the ambiguity in favor of what he in
good faith feels is the most nation-protective reading of the powers in
question, under the circumstances. (If there is no legitimate interpretive ambiguity as to the division of war powers in this situation-if one
assumes it is clear that the President may not act absent direct congressional authorization-one must repair to my third interpretive
principle. I will reconsider this hypothetical below, in that context.3 8 )
This does not mean (as the executive branch might typically assert) that the President may unilaterally initiate war as a matter of
interpretation of the allocation of the Commander in Chief power
and the Declare War Clause power. 39 Nor does it mean that the President possesses extra-constitutional, "inherent," or "emergency" powers
that talismanically devolve on him, notwithstanding the absence of
any textual constitutional grant of such powers. It means that the
Presidential Oath Clause entails a command of presidential duty, and
a corresponding view of the "executive Power," that supplies a rule of
construction for resolving the interpretive ambiguity.
Another set of situations, very much at issue as of the time of this
writing, and likely to have been addressed in Supreme Court decisions
by the time this Article is published, presents similar issues of interpretive ambiguity, where the constitutional law of necessity might legitimately be thought relevant. Do non-U.S. nationals, engaged in armed
combat against the United States, who are captured by the U.S. military (or its allies) abroad in a theater of active combat and held
outside the United States by the military, possess the right to challenge in U.S. courts the lawfulness of their military detentions, during
time of war? May U.S. citizens, who have taken up arms against the
38 See infra Part II.C.
39 The leading academic defenders of such an approach are John Yoo and Robert
Delahunty, both of whom have served in important positions in the Office of Legal
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice. See, e.g., RobertJ. Delahunty &John C.
Yoo, The President's ConstitutionalAuthority to Conduct Military OperationsAgainst Terrorist
Organizationsand the Nations That Harborand Support Them, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoL'v
487, 488 (2002) ("[T]he Constitution vests the President with the plenary authority,
as Commander in Chief and the sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations, to
use military force abroad, especially in response to grave national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks on the... United States.");John C. Yoo, War and
The ConstitutionalText, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 1639, 1654 (2002) ("[T]he Framers would
have understood the President's powers as commander-in-chief and chief executive as
vesting him with the authority to initiate and conduct hostilities.... [T]he power to
declare war would not have been understood by the Framers as a significant restriction on the President's powers in war.").
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United States, as unlawful combatants of a foreign power or enemyin common parlance, war criminals-be held in custody by military
authorities, during time of war, or must they be transferred to civilian
authorities for criminal charges or else released?
I do not purport to offer a detailed analysis of the questions here,
other than to note that the cases present fairly contestable issues of
constitutional interpretation. 40 In such situations, as between competing interpretations, each of which is arguably within the range of
meaning and application of an uncertain provision, should not the
prospect of grave risk or danger to the nation resulting from one of
the alternatives, if satisfactorily established, counsel in favor of the
construction less likely to produce destruction? Should not this principle apply even when the alternative construction might, absent the
danger, be on balance the preferable one? This is not to suggest that
Congress and the judiciary should defer completely to executive or
military judgments about what actions are essential to national security. That is the path of Korematsu. Rather, the point is simply that for
any actor attempting to interpret and apply the Constitution faithfully, the idea that provisions of the Constitution should be construed,
where possible, to avoid grave harm to the nation, is a useful and a
valid principle for choosing between plausible readings of ambiguous
constitutional commands.
A final example of such a situation in which the construe-to-avoid
canon may be applicable is the question of the lawfulness of the use of
military tribunals to administer the war authority of the United States
with respect to violations of the law of war by unlawful enemy combatants/war criminals. The essential question is whether and how the
provisions of Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment apply to such proceedings. Again, the issues strike me as not
entirely free from doubt. The text of the constitutional provisions at
issue would seem, albeit not clearly, to exclude the use of such tribunals and procedures to dispense justice. On the other hand, probably
the better understanding of the nature of such tribunals and procedures is that they are applications of the war power to specialized cir40 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
detention of a U.S. citizen captured within the United States and held without a trial
as an enemy combatant is unconstitutional absent congressional approval), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004); Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1139-45
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the privilege of litigation does not extend to aliens in
military custody outside of the United States), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding the detention of a
U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and held without a trial as an enemy combatant),
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
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cumstances, not really part of the criminaljustice power to which the
provisions in question appear directed. Historical practice, background principles of law against which the Constitution was framed,
and reasonably clear judicial precedent all support the latter
position.

41

Even though, in this particular example, the legitimacy of military
tribunals might appear the better interpretation of the Constitution
even in the abstract, the principle that the Constitution's provisions
should be construed to avoid tendencies toward self-destruction tends
to make a doubtful answer less so. The constitutional law of necessity
and self-preservation dictates that the first responsibility of the President in time of war, when the survival or safety of the nation is at
stake, is to win that war. Where the application of force can fairly be
characterized as an application of the war power rather than the application of a civilian justice-dispensing model, and given that history,
practice, and judicial precedent all support such a characterization of
the use of military tribunals, the fact that such proceedings arise out
of war, as an incident of war, suggests that doubts about the correct
application of the Constitution-be resolved in favor of finding that
such tribunals are constitutional as a necessary ingredient of the war
power.
B.

Necessity, War, and Peace

The last example leads me to the next interpretive principle that
flows from the Constitution of Necessity: the Constitution's provisions
sometimes apply differently in times of war, invasion, rebellion, or other
comparable crisis or emergency, than they do in times of peace. The
use of military commissions to "try" violations of the laws of war by
unlawful enemy combatants is precisely such a case. The fact of war
makes all the difference in the world. In times of peace, the criminal
justice system may be the exclusive method for using state force to
restrain liberty or impose punishment. But in times of war, concerning crimes of war committed by enemy combatants, that is no longer
the case. The Constitution applies, in all its provisions, in time of war
41 See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (holding that German saboteurs captured within the United States can be tried in military commissions). Quinin is both
the key precedent and also contains much of the relevant historical evidence of background understandings and long practice. See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1946) (citing Quirin in upholding the power of the federal government to execute a

Japanese general found guilty by a military tribunal, and denying judicial power to
review the decisions of such military tribunals). See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
ALL THE LAws BUT ONE (1998) (exploring the curtailment of civil liberties during
wartime and the judicial response).
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and in time of peace. But a good number of the Constitution's provisions apply differently to such different situations. The Constitution of
Necessity, apart from supplying a constitutional rule of construction
for other constitutional provisions in cases of uncertain application,
means that some provisions simply apply quite differently where the
preservation and defense of the nation is at stake.
Consider once again the words of President Lincoln, this time in
an 1863 public letter defending military arrests, detentions, and punishments. 4 2 One need not agree with how Lincoln applied this principle in all situations, including the one that provoked the letter (in
which his application seems very likely wrong 4 3), in order to recognize

that the principle itself may be a sound one:
If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies
in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which
would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety does not require them; in other words,
that the Constitution is not, in its application, in all respects the same, in
cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of
profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the
distinction; and I can no more be persuaded that the Government
can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion,
because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in
time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not
good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown not to be
44
good food for a well one.
Lincoln may be being just a bit too slick here, in one respect: the
provision of the Constitution that "makes the distinction" between
times of rebellion or invasion and other times concerns the power to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus-Article I, Section
9. It feels like a lawyer's trick to extrapolate from a specific power to

suspend a specific right to a general power to suspend rights generally. Indeed, one could very plausibly argue just the reverse, on an
expressio unius type of logic: that the mention of a specific suspension42 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 17, at 454.
43 The occasion for this public statement was a limited defense of the propriety of
his general's having arrested and tried Clement Vallandigham, an Ohio Congressman
who was engaged in antiwar agitation asserted to have a deleterious effect on the
military. I find Lincoln's justification in the specific case unpersuasive, and the actions of his administration in violation of the First Amendment, but Lincoln's case is
more plausible than academics tend to portray it. See Paulsen, supra note 15 (manuscript at 700-03, 702 n.24) (on file with Notre Dame Law Review).
44 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, supra note 42, at 460 (second emphasis added).

1278

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 79:4

of-customary-rights power impliedly demonstrates the absence of a
more general rights-suspension power in the national government.
(This is one of the points Professor Prakash makes in critique of my
general thesis, and I concede that it is a good one.)
In the end, though, it is true neither that the existence of the
Writ Suspension Clause establishes a general principle of necessity nor
that the negative implications of the Writ Suspension Clause tend to
disprove the general principle. The idea of a constitutional law of
necessity flows not from the Writ Suspension Clause, but from the
presidential duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
and the logical proposition that such a duty implies a duty (and
power) of the President to take action indispensably necessary to preserve the nation whose Constitution it is. The specifics of the writsuspension power neither prove nor disprove the general proposition.
But Lincoln is also making a narrower point. And it seems an
obvious one: that at least some of the Constitution's provisions obviously do not apply in precisely the same way in time of war, national
emergency, or grave peril, as they do in time of peace and security.
One such example is, obviously, the Writ Suspension Clause-a power
triggered by the existence of a condition of rebellion or invasion
where public safety is deemed by the relevant decisionmaker(s) to require temporary suspension of customary civil liberties. Another famous example Lincoln might have invoked for this general
proposition is his Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln consistently
disclaimed having had any power to free the slaves by executive order,
throughout the nation, as a matter of ordinary executive power in
time of peace. As explained in his letter to Senator Hodges, set forth
at length above, 45 the Emancipation Proclamation was a military measure, triggered by the existence of military necessity in the fight to save
the nation. Nor was it the case that the power came into being immediately upon the start of the rebellion, in Lincoln's view. It only became a proper war measure when it became indispensably necessary.
In addition, one might legitimately ask whether the President was required to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause-the constitutional requirement that slaves escaping to free states be "delivered up on
Claim"'46 of the slaveowner-during the Civil War, as to claims made
by slaveholders residing in rebel states. Here, apparently, is an example of a constitutional requirement that might legitimately be dispensed with, under the special circumstances that existed at the time.
45
46

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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In each such case, national government powers exist or do not
exist depending on the circumstances of national necessity. Plainly,
then, it is true that not all constitutional provisions apply in the same
way in time of war or crisis as they do in time of peace and stability.
Would that it were not so: it is somewhat disheartening to think that
individual rights might legitimately need to contract during times of
war; it is discouraging to wonder whether such a situation could degrade into a permanent status; it is scary to contemplate a willful national government employing such a distinction unjustifiably, for
insidious purposes. But it is a somewhat sad reality of our Constitution. The qualifier "somewhat" is appropriate, though. For the flipside of sadness that individual rights contract is relief that the
Constitution wisely bends to give the government power to take actions necessary to preserve the nation and the Constitution.
Are there other specific provisions of such a nature? Again without attempting to be comprehensive, there seem to me to be several.
Typically, they are constitutional provisions that provide a standard
rather than a bright-line rule with respect to the scope of individual
rights. For example, what constitutes a "reasonable" search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment surely depends
on the circumstances. 47 One of those circumstances is national security. A search that might otherwise be unreasonable might become
reasonable in an emergency. (Even the Supreme Court's convoluted
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence embodies "exigent circumstances"
exceptions to usual requirements.) A danger of a nuclear bomb being detonated tends to make a necessary search seem reasonable, at
least to most reasonable (i.e., non-law professor) minds. If terrorists
can wreak havoc by hijacking airplanes with small weapons, it is reasonable to strictly screen all passengers, probable cause or not. And
whatever the propriety of racial or other profiling in police work generally, if information about an impending or suspected upcoming act
of war or terrorism against the United States or its citizens correlates
with the believed attackers' race or gender, it becomes commensurately more reasonable to "profile" based on such characteristics.
Similarly, what process is "due" before the government takes certain actions with respect to detention or incarceration of individuals,
and what punishments are "cruel and unusual" under the circumstances, are questions of application of general standards, not brightline rules. As such, how they apply in different or unusual circumstances-or, to be more specific, in circumstances involving grave na47 I have defended this proposition in other work, considered apart from concerns of national security. See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 1460-62, 1472-76.
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tional danger-depends to a significant degree on those
circumstances.
This is not to say that all constitutional provisions in favor of individual liberties are of such a nature. They are not. Many establish
hard rules, not soft standards. Nor is it to say that all provisions of the
Constitution are subject to one great big balancing test, as Professor
Prakash devilishly chided me-knowing how much it would irritate
me-at the symposium presentation of these ideas. It is simply to say
that, where the Constitution sets a standard, and where that standard's application is arguably circumstance-dependent, how that standard applies certainly must take into account the constitutional law of
necessity. Indeed, such provisions seem to have built into them the
flexibility to accommodate such circumstances.
At a workshop in which an earlier version of this Article was
presented, some questions raised the increasingly well worn hypothetical of the propriety of torturing a suspect if necessary to obtain information about the whereabouts of a nuclear bomb about to destroy
New York City. To me this is a relatively easy question. Torture is a
horrible thing; there is great danger in explicitly sanctioning it; there
are slippery-slope tendencies, once authorized in principle, to apply
such tactics where not necessary; it may produce unreliable information. But in principle, if it were known that by torturing the guilty one
could reliably obtain information necessary to save millions of innocents, I believe such action is morally justified. More than that, I
believe it would be constitutional. It would not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The reasonableness of the intrusion is a function of the
circumstances, and the magnitude of the imminent danger can justify
what otherwise might be an unreasonable seizure of the person. At
the very least, surely the urgent necessity of averting a cataclysmic occurrence is a legitimate consideration in the constitutional calculus.
For some, this medicine is too strong. But as Lincoln put it in his
1863 letter to Corning, the fact that medicine might be poor food for
a well man does not mean it is not good medicine for a sick one.
Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of Public Discussion, the Liberty of
Speech and the Press, the Law of Evidence, Trial by Jury, and
Habeas Corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I
trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a
man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during tempo-
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rary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder
48
of his healthful life.

As noted above, I disagree with Lincoln's application of these
principles in the specific context before him, involving the freedom of
speech of an antiwar agitator. But even that disagreement suggests a
further observation. With respect to a great many constitutional provisions, including those seemingly cast in absolute terms-hard rules,
not standards-the courts have found implied exceptions in favor of
necessity, in the form of sufficiently "compelling" interests to justify
what otherwise would be departures from the baseline constitutional
rule. Put bluntly, the courts have turned many seemingly bright-line
rules into amorphous balancing tests, and balanced away constitutional rights against perceived policy imperatives. To whatever extent
one accepts such decisions as being consistent with the Constitution
(and I am more skeptical than most in this area), they too are examples where specific provisions of the Constitution apply differently in
different circumstances. If freedom of speech can be balanced
against ostensibly "compelling" interests in regulation of campaign expression; 49 if the free exercise of religion can be balanced against
"compelling" interests in administrative convenience; 50 if the equal
protection of the laws permits racial profiling, classification, and differential treatment upon a showing of a "compelling" interest in racial
diversity in state law school classroom discussions, 51 it would seem to
follow a fortiori that compelling interests in national self-preservation,
national security, and protection of innocent civilians from military or
terrorist attack by foreign enemies likewise could justify restrictions of
constitutional freedoms and protections.
I tend to think that the better understanding of such "compelling
interest" exceptions to constitutional provisions is not that such provi48 Letter from Abraham Lincoln, supra note 42, at 460-61.
49 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 659-66 (2003) (holding that the limitations on political parties' power to spend, raise, solicit, or direct
campaign funds is not an impermissible infringement upon the parties' free speech
because the government's interest in preventing apparent and actual corruption constitutes a "sufficiently important" interest to allow for limitations on such campaign
related activities).
50 For a collection of dubious assertions of "compelling government interest" in
the area of free exercise of religion, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through
It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249, 263-83 (1995).
51 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346-47 (2003) (holding that, while
the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose was to do away with government imposed discrimination based on race, the use of race in admissions decisions is acceptable if the
policy is to be of a limited duration, because of the compelling state interest in "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body").
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sions, on their own terms, contemplate balancing tests. That is, they
are not provisions of the sort that can fairly be described as properly
depending, in their application, on the circumstances. Rather, I think
that such "compelling interest" tests can only be justified in theory (if
at all) on some variant or another of the proposition that principles of
constitutional necessity-interests of a sufficient order of importance
that they can be thought of as explicitly or impliedly of constitutional
stature- trump what otherwise would be the constitutional rule. They
are, in short, illustrations of my third interpretive principle, to which I
now turn.
C. Necessity as a Rule of ConstitutionalPriority
The third interpretive principle is, quite rightly, the most controversial. The rule of necessity is not only a rule of construction with
respect to ambiguous provisions; it is not only a rule of different application of certain provisions in time of war or crisis as opposed to
peace and repose. More than these, the rule of necessity is, when
push comes to shove, a rule of constitutionalpriority. The first duty of
the President of the United States is to preserve, protect, and defend
the nation, through every indispensable means. That duty is both a
precondition to and an essential aspect of the duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. The duty is superior to the duty to
enforce any particular provision, where doing so would be in conflict
with such a broader conception of constitutional duty.
As Lincoln put it-correctly-"a life is never wisely given to save a
limb."52

If this principle is right, it implies a meta-rule of constitutional
interpretation: that preserving the Constitution as a whole-preserving the United States of America and "We the People" who ordained
and established the Constitution-must, in the event of conflict, take
precedence over strict adherence to specific parts of that Constitution. The parts must be understood as subordinate to, and contingent
on, the preservation of the whole. It is true that the Constitution contains no true "severability clause." Thus, any time that a specific provision is violated, the Constitution is violated and we no longer have, for
so long as the violation persists, quite the same "Constitution" we had
absent the violation. The Constitution is a whole. But it surely cannot
be that as between the choice of two impairments of the constitutionalsystem,
one of which destroys more of the system, or all of it, and one of which destroys
less, that no action may be taken which tends to destroy, even tempo52

Letter from Abraham Lincoln, supra note 20, at 585 (emphasis added).
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rarily, less of the Constitution, if doing so is (correctly) judged indispensably necessary to avoid destroying more of it. Even for one who
aspires to be a constitutional purist (as I do), and follow the logic of
the Constitution where it leads, it is hard to say that the Constitution is
properly interpreted to require such a self-destructive course. Our
constitutional life is never wisely given to save a constitutional limb.
Hear Lincoln again on this point:
[M]y oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means,

that government-that nation-of which that constitution was the
I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional,might
organic law ....
of the conbecome lawful, by becoming indispensableto the preservation
53

stitution, through the preservation of the nation.
Lincoln's logic is flawless here, though the result may be counterintuitive. His rule is one of constitutional duty creating sensible constitutional priorities, with the result that measures that might
otherwise be thought unconstitutional in fact become constitutionally
justified on the basis of a superior principle. Note well: This is not a
doctrine of extra-constitutional emergency powers, or a power to suspend the Constitution. Rather, it is a rule of the Constitution. It is a
rule of logical priority of not sacrificing the whole of the Constitution
to a part.
In a sense, this principle can be seen as nothing more than an
internal rule of construction of the Constitution, similar in a way to
the rule offered earlier that specific provisions should be construed to
avoid constitutional implosion or tendencies to self-destruct. Here,
the rule of construction is an interpretive rule for reconciling conflicting (by hypothesis) constitutional provisions. Where one concludes that
two constitutionalprovisions unavoidably conflict, apply the more fundamental, foundationalprovision ratherthan the less important one, precisely to the

extent of the conflict. If one accepts the principle that the Presidential
Oath Clause's "preserve, protect and defend" injunction is an allusion
to, or itself the statement of, a principle of constitutional self-preservation, to be carried out by the President pursuant to the executive
power of the nation, then one needs a rule for deciding what to do
when that constitutional provision conflicts with another one.
My thesis is that the "preserve, protect and defend" command
must take priority over practically any other constitutional rule set
forth in the document. 54 This is not an unusual canon in the least.
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 As discussed below, there are some checks against abuse by the President of his
constitutional power to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution (by protecting
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Nor is it in the least improper to identify such a canon as implicit in
the nature of the Constitution as a unified written text-a "Code" as it
were, not terribly different from other legal codes or systems. The
Framers of the Constitution recognized (and we continue to recognize today) canons of legal interpretation to be applied when two statutes within a single code or system of laws conflict. In The Federalist
No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, in the course of his explanation of the
simple logic of what we call 'Judicial review," first notes this rule for
"determining between two contradictory laws":
It not uncommonly happens that there are two statutes existing at
one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other and neither
of them containing any repealing clause or expression .... So far as

they can, by fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason
and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is
impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one
55
in exclusion of the other.
Hamilton continues, noting that "[t] he rule which has obtained
in the courts" in such cases "is that the last in order of time shall be
preferred to the first" but that this is "a mere rule of construction, not
derived from any positive law but from the nature and reason of the
thing" that the courts have adopted as "consonant to truth and propriety" as a way of deciding as between "interfering acts of an equal authority. '5 6 Hamilton then goes on, more famously but of less
relevance here, to describe the rule that "the nature and reason of the
thing" indicates that between interfering acts of a superior authority
(constitutions) and an inferior authority (such as statutes) "the prior

the nation and its people) that are themselves so fundamental to preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution against internal abuse by a willful, corrupt,
usurping President, acting (wrongly) in the name of protecting the nation, that they
must be deemed to weigh against the legitimacy of a purported assertion by the President of the principle of constitutional priority. See infra Part III.B. The checks I have
in mind are those created by the existence of periodic elections, the existence of the
other branches of the national government, and the ultimate availability of the check
of impeachment-the precise checks noted by Alexander Hamilton at the close of
The FederalistNo. 77's multi-paper discussion of the Presidency as the core "requisites
to safety" of the public against a President who would abuse his constitutional powers.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 77, supra note 1, at 431-32 (Alexander Hamilton). These
checks mark the limit of legitimate presidential power to act in the name of necessity.
It is hard to imagine any situation where presidential action eviscerating checks on
presidential power possessed by the other branches of national government could be
justified as indispensably necessary to save the Constitution. See infra note 77.
55 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton).
56 Id.
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act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an
57
inferior and subordinate authority."

The situation I have posited is "interfering acts of an equal authority" within the Constitution itself. Like Hamilton, I maintain that the
first step (my first interpretive principle) is to seek to reconcile the
two to each other, insofar as practicable. Thus, specific provisions
should be construed to avoid conflict with the broader principle of
overall national and constitutional survival, wherever they are fairly
susceptible of such a "saving" construction. But where this is "impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity" (an interesting choice of
words) "to give effect to one in exclusion of the other." 58
Lincoln's insight with respect to conflicts between constitutional
principles is the same as Hamilton's for statutory conflicts: to determine which to give effect, one needs a second order rule "consonant
to truth and propriety" that accords with "the nature and reason of
the thing."5 9 Lincoln's principle was simple and straightforward: the
part must yield to the whole; the less fundamental provision must
60
yield to the essential provision.
One can see further support for such an approach in The Federalist No. 40. James Madison defended the propriety of the Constitutional Convention's seeming enlargement of its charge by proposing a
completely new constitution, on the ground that the Convention had
a choice between two competing mandates-to frame "a nationalgovernment, adequate to the exigencies of government and of the Union"; and
to propose "alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation" ef-

fecting such changes. 6 1 Madison defended the Convention's proposed scrapping of the Articles as being necessary in order for the
Convention to adhere to the more important mandate. Madison offered the following general statement of interpretive priorities:
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason as well
as founded on legal axioms. The one is that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be
made to conspire to some common end. The other is that where
the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important

57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 For a systematic presentation of Lincoln's views in this regard, and its extension to other areas (including the propriety of secession and the impropriety of judicial supremacy), see generally Paulsen, supra note 15.
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 1, at 216 (James Madison).

1286

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

should give way to the more important part; the means should be
62
sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means.
Lincoln's interpretive principle of constitutional priority can thus
be seen as standing in an interpretive tradition with roots in the framing generation and employing the same logic that Madison used in
explaining the propriety of the Constitutional Convention's proposal
and that Hamilton used in the course of explaining why judicial review was consonant with well accepted interpretive rules for reconciling, or subordinating, conflicting legal commands. 63 So viewed, the
third interpretive rule indicated by the Constitution of Necessity is not
quite as radical as it may at first appear.
Indeed, as noted, this view is not so different from myriad "compelling state interest" tests developed by the courts, whereby specific
constitutional provisions are overcome-trumped-by exceptions to
the stated rule implied out of a sense of necessity. Unfortunately,
however, what the courts hold sufficient to constitute such a "compelling interest" often falls well short of what one might think to be true
necessity, in the sense of an urgent need to protect the nation or its
people from devastating events rending the nation-the scope of the
"necessity" principle that I defend here. 64 In short, the argument offered here is that the President of the United States may do, by virtue
of his oath and the duties and powers it implies, what the Supreme
Court of the United States does all the time. Surely, if the idea of
recognizing "compelling" interests sufficient to trump what otherwise
62 Id.
63 Thomas Jefferson invoked similar reasoning in justifying, years later, the propriety of the Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson's view, consistent with his narrow construction of federal powers generally, was that the Purchase was strictly speaking
unconstitutional, but justified by circumstances, and that his duty as President required him to take such action, whether constitutional or not. There are some flaws
in Jefferson's approach-in particular, he seems quite wrong in believing that the
Constitution did not permit acquisition of new territory-but his "necessity" argument is intriguing, and provides indirect support for Lincoln's more rigorous formulation in terms of the obligation created by, and power implied by, the Presidential
Oath Clause. Jefferson wrote:
A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a
good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose
our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, would be to lose
the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them
with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, toJohn B. Colvin (Sept.
20, 1810), in BAsic WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944).
64 See infra Part III.A.
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would be the baseline constitutional rule is a legitimate constitutional
principle, that principle is fully generalizable to all constitutional interpreters-including, of course, the President of the United States.
If the courts may interpret constitutional provisions as containing implied exceptions attributable to necessity, the President may do the
same. (Indeed, on the view that the courts' pronouncements have
special authoritative weight, the President should apply a similar approach in carrying out his own duties of faithful law execution.)
If anything, the principle I defend here is better, because narrower (in addition to being more textually defensible). True constitutional necessity is the standard, not watered-down "compelling"
governmental interests in whatever the government thinks important
at the moment. Only those actions dictated by (in Lincoln's words)
"indispensable necessity"-those actions indispensably necessary to
fulfill the President's obligation to preserve, protect, and defend the
nation whose Constitution it is-should satisfy the standard. (I will
have more to say about this standard, and who is to apply it,
presently.)
All of the examples offered above, for the first two interpretive
propositions, could also serve as examples of the third proposition of
constitutional priority. Indeed, Professor Prakash, commenting on
this Article at the symposium, asked why one should not simply cut to
the chase and always invoke this third point, rather than labor
through the other two. One simple answer might be that the less dramatic, sweeping constitutional rule should be the first resort, and the
more extreme rule resorted to only in extremis, when no other principle would do. As should be immediately apparent, the more sweeping
rationale is potentially difficult to cabin and, because more sweeping,
its abuse would sweep in greater dangers.
A further possible objection to this theory (aside from its evident
dangers, which I address in the next Part), is that, if actually applied, it
might well mean that the President of the United States had greater
executive power than the British King to act, in emergency situations,
in violation of usual legal restrictions. Surely (the argument goes)
that cannot be a correct construction of "[t]he executive Power" of
Article II, as the Framers understood it; a construction cannot be correct if it would result in the President possessing, in any circum65
stances, powers greater than the British King.
Accepting for the sake of argument the premise concerning the
scope of the British King's power to act in an emergency (a point
65 Professor William K. Kelley of the Notre Dame Law School posed this question
at the symposium, and I thank him for it.

1288

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

which I am unprepared to contest without further research), it does
not quite follow that the President's powers must always be less. To be
sure, the Constitution's Framers withheld from the President, or required him to share with others, certain powers traditionally associated with the British King. But the U.S. Constitution is a written
Constitution, and it is not at all impossible that the logical implications of a written power, fairly construed, might permit valid applications that would not have been anticipated by the provision's drafters
and that might permit some exercises of power not traditionally recognized as belonging to the British King of the time.
For example, the British King lacked any power to suspend application of the laws-to refuse to execute an enactment of Parliament.
Yet if it is true that the President of the United States, by virtue of the
Presidential Oath Clause, the "take care" clause, and the structural
priority of the written Constitution over legislative enactments contrary to it, may decline to execute a statute on the ground that it is
unconstitutional,that is a power the British King would not have had. 66
In form, such action resembles a power to "suspend" the laws. And in
substance, where the power of constitutional legal review exists, it has
essentially that consequence. But that consequence flows from the
logical implications of written constitutionalism and constitutional
supremacy over legislative acts. Great Britain did not (and does not)
have a written constitution, and the idea of constitutional supremacy
over legislative acts is incoherent under the British model.
In similar fashion, the relevant question is whether the Presidential Oath Clause reflects an understanding of executive power, and
imposes a duty on the President, that might mean that, under the U.S.
constitutional system, the President possesses authority to apply a constitutional law of necessity in situations where the British King would
have lacked a corresponding power. It is not sufficient, I believe, to
take the King as a baseline and assume that any uses of power "above"

66 See J. Randy Beck, PresidentialDefiance of "Unconstitutional"Laws: Reviving the
Royal Prerogative,16 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 422-24 (1999) (book review) (reviewing
the history of the abolishment of the King's power to suspend statutes with the passage of the English Bill of Rights and arguing that the King's suspending power is
distinguishable from executive review on the ground that executive review only exists
for violations of the Constitution, not as a general veto); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 905, 924-27 (1990) (arguing for "presidential
review," under which the President may refuse to enforce laws thought by the President to be unconstitutional, but denying the President the power to refuse to enforce
specific judgments of the courts).
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that line by the American President are, for that reason alone,
67

unconstitutional.
My contention is not that the "Constitution of Necessity" was specifically intended by the Framers, but that it is a logical consequence
of the provisions they wrote and the system that they created-and
that this, rather than subjective intentions or expectations, is what
counts. To be sure, they could have been more explicit in creating
emergency power in the President. Instead, it is left to inference and
deduction from what must be conceded to be a somewhat cryptic provision-the President's oath. But the whole issue is whether this inference and deduction is a sound one. Moreover, there may have been
good reasons not to be explicit, as we shall see.
III.

STANDARDS, DECISIONMAKERS, DANGERS, AND CHECKS

The problem with all this, of course, is that it is susceptible to
abuse. The fact that a power is dangerous, however, does not prove
that it does not exist. 68 It proves only that it is dangerous. The existence of such danger suggests that the standards for the exercise of
the dangerous power be constrained, and that its exercise not go unchecked by others. I conclude, therefore, with a brief-and prelimi67 Justice Taney made a similar objection to the President's asserted power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in his opinion in Ex parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Justice Taney wrote:
And no one can believe that, in framing a government intended to guard
still more efficiently the fights and liberties of the citizen, against executive
encroachment and oppression, they would have conferred on the president
a power which the history of England had proved to be dangerous and oppressive in the hands of the crown; and which the people of England had
compelled it to surrender, after a long and obstinate struggle on the part of
the English executive to usurp and retain it.
Id. at 150.
68 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74,
84 (1861):
This is a great power in the hands of the chief magistrate; and because it is
great, and is capable of being perverted to evil ends, its existence has been
doubted and denied .... Yes, certainly it is dangerous-all power is dangerous-and for the all-pervading reason that all power is liable to abuse ....
Still, it is a power necessary to the peace and safety of the country, and undeniably belongs to the Government, and therefore must be exercised by some
department or officer thereof.
Id.; cf Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 44 (1849):
It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may be
abused. All power may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would
be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power
would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual.
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nary-discussion of how the "Constitution of Necessity" is to be
applied, and who is to do (and who is to restrain) the applying.
A.

Standards

President Lincoln had it pretty much right, as to the core standard: "indispensable necessity. ' 69 Lincoln considered it his duty to
preserve, "by every indispensable means, that government-that na70
tion-of which the constitution was the organic law."
Under Lincoln's standard, what are the interests sufficiently compelling to invoke the constitutional principle of necessity? There is
fair room for argument: surely national survival qualifies; surely protection of the nation against devastating military or terrorist attack,
potentially crippling our ability to respond and continue to protect
the nation against its enemies; probably protection of the nation's people, in circumstances falling well short of a risk of complete destruction of the constitutional order. I would be inclined to press the
scope of compelling national interests at least that far, and probably
further. But there are limits: surely the President could not properly
invoke, as national interests sufficiently compelling to invoke a principle of necessity, some of the things that courts have found to be "com71
pelling" in the myriad areas where such tests have been applied.
The standard of "indispensable necessity" also implies a close
means-ends fit of measure to compelling objective. The fact that national survival is important does not mean that the government can
nationalize the steel mills to avert a labor strike. 72 Not all measures
that might arguably further national security goals are indispensably
necessary to those goals. Lincoln viewed habeas suspension, and even
emancipation, as measures of last resort, not first.
Such "compelling interest" and "narrowly-tailored" or "least-restrictive means" tests pop up everywhere in constitutional law. If such
standards, with their unavoidable imprecision, are acceptable in other
areas of constitutional law, it is hard to see why a similar standardespecially one so formulated as to be at the strictest end of the continuum-should not likewise be tolerable in the context of actions taken
to preserve, protect, and defend the fundamental survival of the
73
United States and its people.
69

Letter from Abraham Lincoln, supra note 20, at 585-86.

70

Id.

71

See supra notes 49-51.

72 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
73 I have not attempted to tie the relevant standard to any particular formulation
of the courts in any particular context, but certain truly strict doctrinal formulations
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Who is to Judge?

But who is to judge whether that standard is satisfied? The question of the relevant decisionmaker or decisionmakers is as important
as the standard itself, perhaps more so.
My answer is that the President, at least in the first instance-and
perhaps even ultimately-must make the call. That is intrinsic in the
nature of the power and the raw fact that the Constitution locates it in
the President. It is the Presidentthat swears the oath to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution. It is in the nature of executive
power, and the office, to bear this responsibility. In the press of circumstances, it is the President who must be the judge of whether exigency requires action, whether such action comports with the
fundamental charge to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States of America, and the course of action that the
situation requires. The Constitution establishes the duty, and "[t]he
' 74
responsibility must be where the power is."
strike me as appealing analogies, specifically the standard for suppression of assertedly dangerous advocacy urged by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 376-78 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring):
[T] here must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.... The fact that speech is
likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to
the State.
Id. With respect to the duty to preserve, protect, and defend the nation, there must
be a reasonable ground to fear that a serious, imminent evil will result if action is not
taken. Brandeis's free speech formulation goes on to state: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an
emergency can justify repression." Id. at 377. Likewise for the constitutional law of
necessity: if time and circumstances admit of alternative measures of intercepting the
evil-measures not generally "otherwise unconstitutional"-those measures, not the
doctrine of necessity, are to be employed. See also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States
(Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[O] nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of
a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining
order.").
74 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). This was Lincoln's
view as well. Lincoln believed that some constitutional officer must make the ultimate
judgment of what necessity dictates and that, in time of war, that judgment devolves,
finally and unavoidably, on "the man whom, for the time, the people have under the
constitution, made the commander-in-chief, of their Army and Navy .... " President
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That does not mean-cannot mean-that the power is an unchecked one. The power is not exclusive to the President. And it is
worthy of repetition that the power is not plenary either. The President of the United States is given the responsibilityfor making the judgment. But that does not mean that he may do whatever he wants, and
it does not mean that other constitutional actors should go along with
whatever he does. Constitutional responsibility does not imply constitutional unaccountability.
As suggested at the outset of this Article, Congress has a substantial measure of power to direct, control, limit, and check the President
in this area. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.' 75 If the Constitution implies a rule of necessity,
and if the President is, by virtue of the Presidential Oath Clause, the
principal interpreter and executor of the constitutional law of necessity, it remains the case that Congress has concurrent power in this
area, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress has
power to make laws for carrying into execution the power to preserve
the nation. That power is both a power to further the President's actions and a power to interpret the "Constitution of Necessity" and
check presidential actions that abuse it. In theory, I believe Congress
could pass a statute providing that "the President is directed to take all
necessary action to preserve, protect, and defend the nation and its
citizens, in time of emergency or crisis, without awaiting specific congressional authorization." If the Presidential Oath Clause suggests the
existence of a constitutional power of self-preservation, Congress can
legislate to implement that power. In theory, Congress equally could
pass a statute purporting to define and limit the circumstances in
which such a power may be exercised-much as the War Powers Resolution has sought to define and regulate the extent of presidential war
powers.7 6 Whether such legislation could effectively constrain presidential action would be (as with the case of the War Powers Resolution) a function of the interaction of the branches, political
circumstances, the good faith of the respective political branches, and
the perceived imperatives of the situation.
Abraham Lincoln, Reply to the Ohio Democratic Convention (June 29, 1863), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 17, at 467.
75 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
76 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). For a
discussion of the War Powers Resolution as an act of congressional interpretation, see
Paulsen, supra note 32, at 242-50.
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Moreover, Congress possesses all of its usual high trump powers
with which to check the President: control over appropriations, a
check on appointments, and ultimately the power to impeach and remove a President it believes to have abused the powers and duties of
the office. In the end, these powers will work to check an abusive
President, or nothing will. The Framers believed that term of office,
congressional powers generally, and the power of impeachment,
would serve as the only appropriate, but nonetheless entirely suffi77
cient, checks on the President.
The courts, too, can serve to check the President. The "Constitution of Necessity" is part of the Constitution, and while it does not
supply crystalline standards readily susceptible of judicial decision,
that does not mean that no proper case could ever come before the
judiciary; nor does it mean that the judges should dismiss all such
matters as "political questions" or that the judges would be obligated
to defer to the President's judgments in all such matters. That the
President's duty is primary, and his responsibility nonabdicable, does
not mean that the judiciary (or Congress) lacks any proper constitutional role and' should acquiesce in whatever the President does. That
the President is charged with the primary role in making judgments
concerning the degree of necessity does not mean that the judiciary
may not render decisions finding a particular judgment to be outside
78
the range of legitimate evaluations of necessity.
77

In The FederalistNo. 77, Alexander Hamilton named the following checks on

presidential power:
[T]he election of the President once in four years by persons immediately
chosen by the people for that purpose, and his being at all times liable to
impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other,
and to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the
common course of law. But these precautions, great as they are, are not the
only ones which the plan of the convention has provided in favor of the
public security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the executive
authority was materially feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States,
would by that plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative
body. What more can an enlightened and reasonable people want?
THE FEDERALIST No. 77, supra note 1, at 431-32 (Alexander Hamilton). It follows
from the checks that the Constitution creates that presidential action in the name of
constitutional necessity is least defensible where it impairs or destroys these checks.
The Constitution itself, in its fail-safe checks against presidential usurpation, implies
that the limits of the doctrine of necessity are marked by the necessity of preserving
political checks to its exercise: elections, impeachment, and the existence of independent coordinate branches of the national government. See supra note 54.
78 For a good working model of proper judicial review of executive or military
judgments, one need look no further than the dissenting opinions in Korematsu, especially that of Justice Murphy. Murphy recognized the legitimacy of wartime actions
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The Japanese Internment Cases-Hirabayashiv. United States7 9
and especially Korematsu v. United States 8 -illustrate presidential and
military misuse of asserted constitutional power in time of war. But
the actions of President Roosevelt were taken with full congressional
authorization and endorsement, and were duly ratified by the Supreme Court. The World War II internment of Japanese-Americans
was a tragic injustice, but it was one perpetrated by all three branches
of the national government. It does not so much demonstrate the
dangers of presidential power (though it does tend to demonstrate
that as well) as the dangers of too-great judicial deference to the judgments of military officials as to when "necessity" really exists and what
"necessity" truly requires. 81
based on necessity and the need to "accord great respect and consideration to the
judgments of the military," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944)
(Murphy, J., dissenting), reviewing such judgments on a deferential standard of "reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage."
Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting). But that did not preclude serious review of the
facts presented to justify the government's actions. See id. at 240-42 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
79 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).
80 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
81 Candor compels me to acknowledge that the overall theory I advance herethat there exists a constitutional law of necessity, and that the President possesses the
duty to take action indispensably necessary to the preservation of the nation-is in
some tension with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), a case
that I have elsewhere celebrated for its holding "that the President of the United
States possesses no inherent, unilateral legislative power in time of war or emergency." Paulsen, supra note 32, at 215. But I believe that Youngstown is more an
illustration than a refutation of the existence of a "Constitution of Necessity." To be
sure, the majority opinion of Justice Black rejected President Truman's assertion of
"inherent" or "emergency" power to seize the nation's steel mills-at least in the particular case at hand-where the power claimed was rather clearly legislative in character. And while Justice Black's opinion is not free of ambiguity on this point, it can
fairly be read as a categorical rejection of the idea of inherent presidential powers.
(Justice Jackson's important and influential concurrence is explicit in this regard,
and I address that opinion presently.)
The result in Youngstown, however, seemed to turn largely on (1) the absence of
true necessity requiring unilateral presidential action, and (2) the presence of con-

gressional action apparently in opposition to-limiting, checking-Truman's actions
taken in the name of necessity. A careful look at the opinions suggests that Youngstown is not inconsistent with a claim of a presidential duty to take action he deems
indispensably necessary to preservation of the nation and its constitutional order; it is
inconsistent only with any claim that such power is unchecked, unreviewable, and
unlimited. In many ways, Youngstown is an illustration of the limits of a constitutional
doctrine of necessity and presidential power to act on such grounds; it is not a repudiation of the possibility of such a doctrine as a general proposition. Interestingly, a
majority of the Justices in Youngstown appears to have embraced some version of the
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"preserve, protect and defend" theory of presidential constitutional power to take
measures indispensably necessary to save the nation and the Constitution. That of
course was the core of Chief Justice Vinson's dissent (for three Justices). See id. at
681-82 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (invoking the Presidential Oath Clause and contending that the Framers did not "create an automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake").
Justice Clark's concurrence (in the judgment only, and not the opinion of the court)
is singularly explicit in embracing a constitutional law of necessity, quoting Lincoln's
letter to Hodges with approval and concluding that "the Constitution does grant to
the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency" and that "such a grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the Constitution itself." Id. at 661-62 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). What made
Clark's opinion a concurrence rather than a dissent was the view-a view shared with
other concurring justices in the majority-that the asserted imperative necessity for
presidential legislative action (1) simply did not exist as a matter of fact, given legal
alternatives available to the President, and (2) was in opposition to Congress's legislative grant of certain powers to act in emergencies and specifically to act in the area of
threatened labor strikes endangering important national interests, and Congress's
reasonably explicit refusal to grant other powers to act, notably the seizure power
claimed by President Truman. See id. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring) ("The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in
meeting the present type of emergency."); id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power .... ).
The most eloquent judicial rebuttal of a constitutional principle of necessity is
contained in Justice Robert Jackson's celebrated concurring opinion in Youngstown.
The Framers "knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We
may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies." Id. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). Especially given Congress's
power, and exercise of its power, to enact legislation granting emergency powers, "I
am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm possession of them
without statute." Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). "Such power either has no beginning or it has no end." Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). When all is said and done,
however, Jackson's opinion, famous for its "categories" of presidential-congressional
interactions, and its recognition of a "zone of twilight" in which powers are unclear
and congressional quiescence can invite, or permit, unilateral presidential action, see
id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring), ruled against President Truman's inherent/
emergency power argument largely because it was not supported on the facts of the
case, and because it was inconsistent with Congress's assertion of its legislative powers
in an area where Congress certainly had nothing less than concurrent authority with
the President. See id. at 637-40 (Jackson, J., concurring). As such, even Jackson's
opinion cannot be read as an absolute rejection of-and can even be read as supporting, to a point-presidential power to construe the Constitution, in areas of ambiguity, to avoid potentially nation-destructive results; to apply certain of its provisions
differently in times of war and national emergency; and to give priority to preservation of the nation whose Constitution it is rather than any particular constitutional
requirement, where such action is truly necessary, and where exercise of such power is
subject to limits created by Congress's exercise of its legislative power.
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In the end, however, it all turns back on the office of President of
the United States. If the duty conferred by the Presidential Oath
Clause is truly an independent, personal, and nonabdicable one, not
exercised in subordination to others, then the President cannot be
bound by the decisions of courts, in the sense that he must defer, no
matter what. Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney's order invalidating
Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus.82 If a President concludes that
the survival of the nation or its people depends on a course of action
that is indispensably necessary to avert such a disaster, his duty as President-his duty to the Constitution-requiresthat he not let a judicial
decision to the contrary prevent him from performing what his duty
requires.
In the end, it really cannot be any other way. The President possesses the power and must exercise final responsibility for its faithful
exercise. As Justice Jackson put it in his dissent in Korematsu:
If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its
restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their
responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries
83
and to the moral judgments of history.
CONCLUSION

As I said at the outset, these are dangerous principles. They can
be misapplied, as all legal principles and powers can. The power contemplated by the Presidential Oath Clause can be misused by evil or
willful or mistaken men and women, as all governmental authority
can, whether exercised by legislative, executive, orjudicial authorities.
But I think that these are right principles, even though they can
be misapplied. I submit that they are correct as a matter of sound
interpretation of the Constitution. I may be wrong in this. But if so,
my error lies in thinking that the Constitution is not a suicide pact; or
in thinking that its provisions should not readily be construed to make
82 I have defended the position that the President need not adhere to judicial
decisions that he concludes, in good faith, are contrary to the Constitution and harmful to the nation. See generally Paulsen, supra note 9, at 276-84 (arguing that the
Presidential Oath and Take Care Clauses give the President the duty to reach legal
conclusions separate from the other branches and are not requirements that the President simply "pledge obeisance to the preferences of the other branches"); Paulsen,
supra note 16, at 82-83 (arguing that the consensus view, that the judiciary is the
supreme interpreter of the Constitution and the President retains the power to make
constitutional determinations as to vetoes and pardons, is analytically incoherent).
83 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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it one; or in thinking that a part should not trump the whole, to the
destruction of the whole (or that "a life is n[ot] wisely given to save a
limb"); or in thinking that the Presidential Oath Clause has real force,
meaning, and content, and that the President has a role in interpreting the Constitution he has sworn to preserve and protect, and that
this might entail some judgment as to what is necessary to preserve the
nation he has sworn to defend. In short, if I am mistaken in all this, so
was President Lincoln.
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